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1. Background 
 
1.1 Purpose of study 
Prepare an overview of corruption in infrastructure provision and service delivery at the 
municipal level in Nepal and a case study of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industries (FNCCI) Anti-Corruption Project. 
 
1.2 Methodology and process 
The overview of corruption in infrastructure provision and service delivery relied mainly 
on secondary data. As a first source, books and reports on the subject were reviewed. 
Most of the information in books and publications concentrated on corruption at the 
national or central government levels, with there being less material available on 
practices at the municipal level. 
As a second source of information, interviews were conducted with municipal officials on 
one side and contractors and private operators on the other. In addition, a number of 
interviews were conducted with the residents of Kathmandu’s squatter settlements in 
order to get insight into the condition of municipal services in those settlements. These 
interactions revealed glimpses into realities at the local level. Kathmandu and a provincial 
municipality, Bharatpur, were chosen for study purposes. 
 
1.3 Brief description of the basic infrastructure 
There are 58 municipalities in Nepal, of which Kathmandu, the capital, has metropolitan 
city status. There are four sub-metropolitan cities – Biratnagar, Birgunj, Lalitpur and 
Pokhara. The rest are what may be termed ‘ordinary’ municipalities. Even among these 
there is enormous variation, with established market towns or administrative centres like 
Bharatpur or Tansen in sharp contrast to new municipalities like Amargadhi or 
Dasrathchand, which are very rural in character. 
Notwithstanding variations in size, importance or character, local municipalities are 
primarily responsible for providing infrastructure services within their localities. The 
number of infrastructural conveniences provided and the extent or quality of service may 
vary certainly. Also, for historic reasons or otherwise, a central government agency or 
service provider could at the same time be responsible for the partial or full provision of a 
service. In many instances this duplication of responsibility leads to some confusion or 
abnegation of responsibility whereby the consumers ultimately suffer. Short descriptions 
of the major infrastructure services in Nepal’s urban areas are given below. 
 
1.3.1 Roads and pavements 
In Nepal, the central government’s road department is responsible for highways and 
important roads, what is termed the strategic road network. However, the construction 
and maintenance of ‘lesser’ roads (i.e., roads below the arterial road category) primarily 
lies with the respective municipality. A significant amount of road length in residential 
areas is constructed under what is called the ‘people's participation’ method. Under this 
method, the residents of the area serviced by the road (street) contribute 40-60 per cent 
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of the total cost. Depending on the area and municipality, this people's contribution could 
be as high as 80 per cent in some cases. The actual construction is achieved through 
contracts. The process is fraught with opportunities for corruption during contract 
awarding, supervision and final bill payment. 
Smaller road construction contracts are sometimes given out to the local community itself 
through some form of community contracting. The scale of corruption in such cases is 
generally low. However, municipalities do not normally give out road construction 
contracts to local communities as a matter of rule, because of the skill levels and heavy 
and specialised equipment required for such work. 
Pavement work is also usually accomplished through the people’s participation method. 
In Kathmandu, the local ward office is normally involved in performing pavement work in 
the numerous alleys and courtyards at the core of old city. 
 
1.3.2 Drainage/sewerage 
As with roads, drains and sewers are also under the municipality's purview, and also in 
common with roads, most drains are constructed under the people's participation 
method. In contrast to roads, however, most drainage projects (apart from the large 
ones) are managed through the local ward office. As the projects are conducted at the 
local level, the opportunities for bribes and so forth are reduced. Drainage projects are 
also easily accomplished with community contracts, because they are simpler and can be 
completed without heavy equipment. 
 
1.3.3 Street lighting 
Street light poles are usually provided during construction, especially on the main streets 
or thoroughfares. Smaller residential streets are lit through the joint efforts of residents 
(through neighbourhood organizations) and the local ward office. The maintenance of 
street lights – replacing bulbs and so on – is also undertaken by the local ward office. 
 
1.3.4 Solid waste management 
Nepalese municipalities have historically been responsible for managing solid waste. As 
a traditional function, the service is also labour intensive and hard to manage because of 
the numbers of personnel involved. Nowadays, many municipalities are resorting to 
contracting out primary waste management tasks (mostly the collection of waste and 
street sweeping) to private operators. The transfer of waste from the transfer station to a 
landfill or other final destination is usually undertaken by the municipality itself. 
Waste collection also takes place at the community level with a lot of community-based 
organizations (CBO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) involvement in tandem 
with municipal operations. Opportunities for corruption in waste management are mostly 
in operation and maintenance, because there is a lot of equipment involved. 
 
1.3.5 Public toilets 
Municipalities also provide public toilets in their areas. These facilities are highly 
beneficial for citizens, especially the poorer ones who may not have this convenience in 
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their own dwellings. While toilets are normally constructed through civil works contracts, 
they are usually operated by private operators through service contracts. 
Public toilet operation is a source of profit for many, but the private operator may have to 
part with a portion of his/her earnings to pay a middleman or similar facilitator to actually 
operate the toilet. Toilets operated under the public-private partnership (PPP) method 
(such as the service centres in Kathmandu) may be able to solve this problem. 
 
1.3.6 Services provided by central-level service providers 
Electricity 
Electricity is provided through a central-level service provider, the Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA), which oversees the national grid as well as power distribution to 
individual consumers. The NEA is wholly government owned and managed. There are 
several private electric or power companies managing smaller hydropower plants, 
however, these are not involved in providing services to consumers directly. In Nepal 
there is increasingly more talk about municipalities taking over the distribution of 
electricity in their own areas. Some combination of private operators and public 
authorities would probably be used in such arrangements. For now, the NEA is the sole 
service provider. 
 
Water supply 
Water supply is under the purview of the government-owned Nepal Water Supply 
Corporation (NWSC) in about 25 municipalities throughout Nepal. In the other 
municipalities, responsibilities are mixed: in some, the municipality is responsible in 
alliance with community user groups; in others, the water supply department of the 
central government still services pocket areas, and so on. However, even in the NWSC 
areas, municipalities have taken on limited roles improving water supply in small areas 
within their jurisdiction. In the capital region of Kathmandu and four other municipalities, 
the Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Board has been established chaired by 
Kathmandu’s mayor with the four other mayors as members. The Board will eventually 
take on the water supply function and manage it with the help of a water authority. 
At the service provision level, there are opportunities for corrupt practices in providing 
connections, manipulating water supply distribution, metering and billing and so on. 
 
1.4 Main sources of livelihood 
The Nepalese economy is characterised by a large agricultural sector, which provides a 
livelihood for 80 per cent of the economically-active population, as well as a small but 
rapidly growing informal urban economy. The agricultural sector, however, contributes to 
only 39.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a high under-employment rate 
and low productivity. This stagnation in agriculture has been associated with an 
increasing reliance by rural households on non-farm income, which derives from migrant 
labour in urban areas as well as employment abroad (particularly in India, the Middle 
East, Malaysia and South Korea). Remittances from employment abroad play a major 
role, both as a source of foreign exchange as well as a source of income for many 
households. The households receiving remittances went up to 32 per cent in 2004 from 
23 per cent in 1996 (Mo, 2005). Such trends suggest growing urban pressures, as well 
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as significant changes in the rural economy and society, including the feminisation of 
agriculture (Nepal Millennium Development Goals, Progress Report, 2005). 
  
1.5 Important social groups 
Nepal is renowned for its socio-cultural diversity of 100 ethnicities, 92 languages and 
nine religions (UNDP, 2004). Of the population, 80.6 per cent is Hindu, followed by 10.7 
per cent Buddhist, 4.2 per cent Muslim and 3.6 per cent Kirant (2001 census).1 
For its size, Nepal has a diverse ethnic composition: 
Chhetri 15.5 per cent, Brahman 12.5 per cent, Magar 7 per cent, Tharu 6.6 per cent, 
Tamang 5.5 per cent, Newar 5.4 per cent, Muslim 4.2 per cent, Kami 3.9 per cent, other 
32.7 per cent and unspecified 2.8 per cent (2001 census). 
 
 
                                                   
1
 Nepal Millennium Development Goals, Progress Report, 2005 
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2. Setting the context –  
Overview of corruption in infrastructure delivery 
In presenting an overview of corruption, an attempt has been made to look into the root 
causes of corruption. It has been found that corruption is on the rise in Nepal because of 
the changes Nepalese society is going through. This section also presents the forms of 
corruption found at the municipal level and concludes with a section on how the urban 
poor in Nepal are coping with municipal service provision. 
 
2.1 Causes of corruption 
2.1.1 Lack of public awareness and a culture of corruption 
The rules of the system of administration and procedures for acquiring services are a big 
mystery for many citizens as there is lack of information available to the general public. 
Public agencies share part of the blame for this. For this reason also, corrupt practices 
are growing. A consumer does not know whether s/he is paying a bribe or a required 
levy. As a result, the public display of ‘citizen charters’ at public offices (for example, at 
land revenue offices) and awareness campaigns undertaken by NGOs have played a 
significant role in improving public awareness and controlling corruption. 
 
2.1.2 Increasing materialism and resulting cultural changes 
As with many other societies, materialism is on the rise and there is now more and more 
respect for money and the people who have it in Nepalese culture. Those who have 
money command prestige in society, irrespective of how they may have earned it. Their 
access to all spheres of society is superior. Increasing materialism is also a cause and 
effect of growing livelihood expenses and the breakdown of traditional social systems 
and mechanisms. These changes have had a direct bearing on the increase in corrupt 
practices. 
As recently as 30 or 40 years ago, societal values were still quite traditional. The social 
hierarchy followed the caste and class distinctions passed down through the years fairly 
closely. Since then, the increased materialism that has resulted from the opening up of 
society and its increasing exposure to ‘modern’ and new values has equated status and 
prestige with the possession of money and the willingness to spend it. 
Large joint families were also the rule rather than the exception in Nepal. Under the joint 
family system, social expenses were shared by the larger family. The system was also 
supplemented by active clan organisations that took care of organising and managing 
social events such as wedding receptions and other life ceremonies. Now with the break-
up of the joint family system, heads of household have to bear these expenses 
themselves. Similarly, the clan organisations (including the land trusts and endowments – 
guthis – they manage) are also less and less active, adding further to social and cultural 
expenses. The tight-knit community system is now a thing of the past. 
The opening up of Nepalese society has also contributed to increased expenses incurred 
by teenagers and older children. While traditionally children stayed within the home and 
only went out on family outings, nowadays youths are more outgoing and incur more 
expenses in the process. A small but significant proportion of teenagers also have 
parents working in other countries, who are able to afford their mostly frivolous expenses.  
  6
Households in urban areas are also spending more money on educating their children. 
This is primarily because of the deteriorating standards of public schools. While school-
level education is free in public schools, an increasing number of parents send their 
children to private schools, which largely outnumber public schools. 
 
2.1.3 Organizational immaturity 
Lack of accountability 
Municipal officers are government employees, and the civil service system makes them 
more accountable to their supervisors at the ministry than to the public they are serving. 
This indirectly encourages bribery. When the officers are charged for involvement in such 
practices, they are transferred and the case is ‘closed’.  
Perverse use of authority 
Among the various reasons for corruption by people in public office (employees or 
elected representatives), the following are possible reasons they might engage in a 
corrupt activity: 
• Not knowing or being unaware of the problems faced by other people, especially poor 
people. Such corrupt public officials are mostly living in their own world and choose to 
remain unaware or uncaring about the problems and livelihoods of other people. 
• A mind-set of ‘what's in it for me?’ –Instead of being guided by altruism or motives to 
serve, people in public office are single-mindedly intent on gaining profit or benefit 
from their present position. This type of thinking is very hard to change and becomes 
a way of life for many. Part of this is also due to the lack of other opportunities in 
municipal employment. 
System of award and punishment 
There is no suitable system of award and punishment in many public organizations. 
Those who are involved in corrupt practices often get away with it. This encourages them 
to continue their corrupt practices. 
Lack of disclosure of information 
Periodic statements of accounts and performance reports are not made public or easily 
available in most municipalities. As a result, people do not get information about activities 
in their areas. This lack of information can lead to bribery. 
 
2.1.4 Acceptance of irregularities 
Nepalese society can be blamed for being silent about government irregularities and 
weaknesses. This may be due to historical and socio-political reasons, such as the 
persistence of feudal values and practices. The traditional notion that ‘nothing can be 
done by writing or speaking out against anomalies in government offices’ is prevalent. 
Even citizens with a so-called ‘modern’ upbringing would bribe officials to get their work 
done rather than think about the far-reaching consequences of their actions. 
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2.1.5 Low salaries 
One of the main reasons for corruption at the municipal level is low salaries. The less 
bureaucrats are paid, the more it pays for them to be corrupt. In Nepal, the salary scale 
of municipal employees is lower than, for example, comparable employees in the private 
sector. Such employees then revert to bribery in order to meet their basic livelihood 
needs. It is hard for them to meet their day-to-day needs on their usual incomes. Social 
obligations are constantly increasing, and it is becoming progressively harder for 
Nepalese families (especially in urban areas) to survive in a society that is more and 
more competitive. So, government officers may feel they are forced to resort to bribery. 
Of course, this is not a sanction for bribery, but corruption to make ends meet is 
somehow tolerated tacitly. 
 
2.2 Forms of corruption at the municipal level 
One of the difficulties in curbing corruption lies in proving the offence or demonstrating 
beyond reasonable doubt that an offence has occurred. There is necessarily a lot of 
reliance on heresy and conjecture. In the informal interviews and meetings with municipal 
personnel and representatives of the private sector, there were also allegations of corrupt 
practices at the municipal level or ‘this is how it happens in our city’ stories. These 
allegations of wrongdoing can be grouped under the following headings. 
 
2.2.1 Corruption in projects 
a. Irregularities during project formulation 
The municipal section or department concerned is capable of manipulating the design 
and cost estimates of projects. Project cost estimates are artificially raised by the 
municipality overestimating costs and using technical specifications that exceed 
conventional requirements. Bidding criteria can be also be fixed to favour a certain party 
when bids are processed. This can then be used as a bargaining point with contractors 
when awarding the contract. 
Bribes are also exchanged during project procurement. The contractor either makes cash 
payments or he/she promises to set aside a cut for municipal personnel when the final bill 
is settled. Municipal staff may oblige payment for disclosing proprietary information 
regarding the project such as the estimate of costs, criteria for bidding, prospective 
bidders and so on. The staff then takes money from the contract bidders for giving out 
such information. There is also a practice of assisting bidders to form cartels to leave out 
bidders that are not cooperating. 
b. Corruption during project execution  
Overvaluation of the job in construction projects, in terms of excessive estimates of 
quantity and price, is a common accusation against municipalities. These practices are 
common in road maintenance projects. Municipalities implement road construction and 
maintenance projects in two ways: with community involvement and without community 
involvement. In projects where there is no community involvement, costs are 
overestimated and extra money is made with the cooperation of the contractor. The 
terms are negotiated beforehand before project implementation. Even in projects with 
community involvement, similar practices take place in collusion with community leaders 
or officials.  
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When the contractor foresees that he/she could potentially lose money on executing a 
project, he/she can get the contract cancelled by bribing the appropriate people to save 
on his losses. Lack of public support and so on, are usually blamed to provide an excuse 
to terminate the project. 
Corruption in project execution has increased in the absence of local representatives 
(mayors) in the municipalities. Municipal staff make project cost estimates themselves 
and implement the projects as well; there is no suitable mechanism for supervision. 
These practices are found in road maintenance (for example, gravelling roads). A 
missing truckload or two of gravel can be easily overlooked. The municipal technical 
experts are sometimes more intent on finding the loopholes in project execution 
regulations in order to be in a better position to bargain with contractors, rather than 
improving practices during the monitoring and evaluation of the project.  
Municipalities also show reluctance to disclose information on projects and revenue 
collection. The reason for this could be that corrupt practices may be revealed by such 
disclosure.  
c. Corruption during account settlement (final billing) 
Contractors have to pay a certain percentage as ‘commission’ during the account 
settlement at different stages of the contract. If they do not pay, the payment may be 
delayed and the contractor blamed for his/her poor work performance. Contractors feel 
comfortable paying the commission as bribe; 10 per cent is customary in many cases. 
Usually, contractors are prepared for this in advance and make the necessary 
adjustments in their work. This will ultimately compromise the quality of work.  
 
2.2.2 Corruption in service delivery (by municipalities and other service providers) 
There are several forms of corruption in delivery of services like drinking water, electricity 
distribution, public toilet operation and so on. 
a. Corruption at the time of providing service connections 
Obtaining a water or electricity connection is made artificially complicated so that 
consumers pay extra to get their service connections. In drinking water, service provider 
personnel provide better connections – a larger hole or better placed hole – depending 
on the bribe amount, resulting in a better flow of water. Similarly with electricity, the 
standard response could be that it is not possible to get a connection from the electric 
pole nearest the residence to be served.  
b. Meter reading 
Meter readers are frequently involved in malpractices such as making adjustments to the 
meter to show a smaller or lower reading. The consumer then pays the meter reader for 
the service. 
c. Supply of services favouring advantaged groups 
Consumers pay water supply personnel to direct more flow of water into their area by 
manipulating water valves. 
d. Operation and maintenance of service facilities 
The costs of repair and maintenance are inflated, thereby enriching personnel employed 
in facilities management departments or sections. For example, it was reported that there 
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is a lot of corruption in the maintenance of municipal vehicles, whereby municipal officials 
produce fake bills for maintenance, fuel and so on. 
e. Unseen partnership arrangements with contractors/ service providers 
In some cases, municipal personnel make known their interest to be involved in a 
potential project as indirect partners. For instance, in one of the municipalities studied, 
private operators in solid waste management were ready to manage the landfill site with 
the establishment of an organic fertilizer plant. The municipality had received proposals 
for the same; however, the municipality was reluctant to award the job because a 
municipal employee wanted to partner the prospective private operator. Such practices 
potentially compromise the quality or price of services offered. There have also been 
similar instances of corruption in the contracting out of sanitation services to private 
contractors. Municipal officials are indirect partners in the fee collection, otherwise they 
threaten to dismiss the contract.  
Another form of corruption in municipalities occurs due to a lack of review and renewal of 
contracts. The municipality allows the same party to continue the contract for a longer 
period than stipulated in the contract. For instance, in a municipal wholesale vegetable 
market, the study found the contract has not been reviewed for 11 years. The 
municipality had contracted out the stalls for Rs.700 to Rs.1000 per month at the time of 
agreement. There was no change in the municipality’s contract, but the occupants at the 
time of the research were paying Rs.3000 to Rs.5000 per stall per month. The original 
tenants of most of the stalls were also relatives of municipal employees. They then sublet 
stalls to current occupants at higher rates.   
 
2.2.3 Other forms of corruption 
a. Operation and maintenance of various facilities 
Maintenance of facilities. There were several instances of corruption in the operation and 
maintenance of a vegetable and fruit market in one of the municipalities. The municipal 
section in charge of the market produced extra bills for graveling work, toilet maintenance 
and other items. Proper records on the vendors and the amount of rent collected from the 
stalls were not maintained. In some cases, receipts of rent paid are not issued. The 
vendors, especially meat vendors, have to make gifts of vegetables, meat and fish to 
municipal officials during festivals. Municipal employees also collect bribes from street 
vendors who would otherwise not be allowed to do business on the street; for example, 
butchers are also forced to pay a certain amount to the municipal police. 
Maintenance of equipment (including fuel consumption and so on). Facilities 
management employees produce fake bills for maintenance, fuel and other items. 
b. Quality control and other monitoring 
Municipalities fail to monitor the quality of meat, vegetables and other food products even 
after requests from local consumer forums. They also fail to take effective action against 
meat vendors and others when they sell goods of inferior quality. 
c. Lack of transparency in revenue collection 
There is a general reluctance to disclose information on projects and revenue collection. 
The reason for this could be that corrupt practices may be revealed by such disclosure. 
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d. Petty corruption 
Municipal staff or personnel such as the city police collect money from footpath vendors 
and other street merchants for them to be allowed to do business on the street. Butchers 
frequently have to pay money to city police and are also expected to gift meat or fish to 
municipal officials during festivals. 
 
2.3 The urban poor and municipal services 
The Kathmandu Valley area with its five municipalities – Bhaktapur, Kathmandu, Kirtipur 
Lalitpur, and Madhyapur Thimi – has around 66 squatter or informal settlements. Of 
these, the one in Bijaynagar (in eastern Kathmandu Metropolitan City) is the largest with 
524 households. Infrastructure service provision to the individual settlements varies. In 
terms of water supply, most settlements lack drinking water connections or even public 
standpipes. In the Buddhanagar settlement (in south-eastern Kathmandu), out of the 105 
households, only four had individual connections. However, the households here had 
access to pumped ground water. Overall, an overwhelming number of settlement 
households (estimated at around 98 per cent) in Kathmandu had access to electricity. 
 
2.3.1 Coping with municipal services 
2.3.1.1 Water supply 
Water supply in the Kathmandu area is becoming a progressively bigger problem for a 
number of reasons, among which high population growth (mainly from in-migration) and 
changing water consumption patterns have had a great impact. In this situation of 
depleting water supply, poorer communities, especially the marginalized ones, have 
developed their own innovative ways of coping with their need for drinking water. 
a. Community taps for a group or community of households 
Instead of getting individual water connections, households in some Kathmandu squatter 
settlements have acquired community taps serving 10 or 11 households depending on 
the location. This arrangement probably came out of the Nepal Water Supply 
Corporation's (the central-level service provider) unwillingness to provide individual 
connections to households without land ownership certificates. Procedure-wise, affected 
residents approach the local ward office regarding their lack of water. The ward office 
then writes a recommendation for the need to supply water and the NWSC agrees to 
supply water to the area at no additional cost to itself. Usually what happens is that the 
capital costs of extending distribution lines and so on, are borne by a corresponding NGO 
or other voluntary organization. Such organizationsmay also put up the entire deposit 
money required by the NWSC, or provide this deposit in collaboration with the Society for 
Preservation of Shelter and Habitation in Nepal (SPOSH-NEPAL) and possibly the 
individual consumer households as well. 
The residents of Balaju Jagriti Tole in Ward 16 in north-western Kathmandu have 
adopted this method to fulfil their water needs. Eleven houses share one tap; as the 
NWSC supplies water only every other day in Kathmandu, each house gets to draw 
water every 7-9 days. A local NGO, Lumanti, provided funds for the water connections 
including distribution line extension. 
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b. Community water tanks 
Some communities have also adopted the practice of installing a community-level water 
tank. Here again, the NWSC itself or an NGO/ voluntary organization provides the capital 
costs for the water tank. The community contributes towards installing the tank on site. 
The residents then follow a code of conduct for using the tank – how much water to draw, 
how frequently each household can draw water and so on. 
In Sangam Tole, which is across the river from Balaju Jagrity Tole described above, the 
residents have installed a 5,000-litre tank provided by NWSC free of cost. About 36 
households use the tank. Usage is not restricted to just squatter households, 
neighbouring houses also use the tank. Each household has a 40-litre quota, and it can 
use the tank twice a week. The households have also distributed coupons to regulate the 
drawing of water more effectively. 
Some of the residents of Khadi-pakha, a settlement in northern Kathmandu, have also 
installed water tanks. Water supply in Khadi-pakha (which is comprised of about 225 
households) is generally good; however, service in two isolated areas is very poor. So 
the residents have got together and installed a water tank as an additional measure.  
c. Use of mobile water tankers during times of acute shortage 
The NWSC sends water tankers to supply water to pockets experiencing acute water 
shortages for whatever reasons, such as faults in the system through leaks and so on. It 
is not clear whether the Corporation sends out tankers on their own assessment or if they 
respond to demands from affected residents. The residents the team interviewed 
responded that they used this service from time to time. 
 
2.3.2 Sanitation/ drainage 
Most of the squatter settlements lack proper sanitation or drainage facilities. Some 
settlements like Buddhanagar or Khadi-pakha have underground drains built by Lumanti. 
Lumanti has also helped with building or providing support for building individual latrines. 
 
2.3.3 Education 
Although school-level education is free in Nepal, expenses are still incurred in paying 
annual school fees, making uniforms, buying textbooks and so on. The local ward office 
and some NGOs help children in squatter settlements in meeting the above expenses. 
 
2.3.4 Electricity 
As regards electricity, only a few houses had this service before, while other households 
shared the service on a community basis. Now all households have their own 
connections without any real problems. The Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) was now 
willing to issue connections to dwellings in squatter settlements on the basis of an ID 
Card issued to residents of such settlements by the Society for Preservation of Shelter 
and Habitation in Nepal (SPOSH-NEPAL). Normally, the NEA requires land ownership 
certificates in order to process applications for electric connections. But nowadays after 
various forms of pressure from residents of squatter settlements, the NEA has been 
persuaded to issue connections against squatter ID cards.  
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2.4 Effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor 
Corrupt practices at various stages of municipal service provision have had a detrimental 
effect on poor communities, directly because the poor cannot afford the payoffs required 
to acquire services and indirectly because such practices also impact service providers' 
ability to extend or expand services because of lost revenues and for other reasons. 
Some of the effects of corruption on poor people's livelihoods are given below. 
1. In the case of drinking water, due to the corrupt practice of giving undue advantage to 
individual households that pay extra (to get pipeline connections  lower down on the 
trunk line, for tightening or loosening the ferrule cock and so on.) the supply of water 
to the poor is always less compared to advantaged groups. Poor people always live 
with scarcity of drinking water, even with standpipes in their locality. 
2. Due to malpractices in recording meter readings, lower income groups that cannot 
afford the extra payments to the meter readers end up paying more than higher-
income people who consume more water. 
3. Similar malpractices are also prevalent in electricity meter reading. 
4. Due to leakage in revenue collection, the Nepal Water Supply Corporation runs at a 
constant operational loss. As a result, it cannot extend its distribution coverage to 
poor neighbourhoods due to lack of funds for pipeline extension. This further limits 
the accessibility of the poor to piped drinking water supplies. 
5. Due to the widespread practice of giving extra money to get a new electricity line, it is 
always time-consuming and troublesome for poor people to get a new line. 
6. Due to the leakage in revenue collection of the electricity supply, the Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA) has to operate at a loss and cannot make investments towards 
extending its distribution lines. Usually the NEA asks the neighbourhood to bear the 
cost of electric poles and other main line extension costs. This also contributes to 
depriving the poor from getting an electricity supply in their areas. 
7. Because of the internal partnership arrangements with the staff of the municipality, 
the supervision and monitoring of solid waste management in the municipal areas is 
not carried out effectively. Again, the most affected communities are the poor. 
Usually the contractors on good terms with municipal staff do not service the poor 
areas. They argue that such areas incur higher operational costs to service because 
of the distance from the city centre and lower revenue collection for door-to-door 
collection services. Private operators not only ignore door-to-door collections, but 
also street sweeping in these localities. 
8. Street lights in most of the municipalities are not in good working condition. Usually 
the operation and maintenance expenses for the street lights are borne by the 
municipality itself. Due to corruption in procurement of goods (bulbs, light fixtures, 
wire and other electrical fittings) and services, the street lights seldom light up and 
the hardest hit are again the poor because they have to walk in the dark and face 
other related problems as well.  
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3. Description of anti-corruption mechanisms 
Anti-corruption mechanisms can be grouped under four headings: 
 
3.1 Preventive measures 
Preventive measures to curb corruption seek to anticipate acts of corruption and stop 
them from taking place. Many of these measures are included within codes of conduct 
and laws. Preventive measures can be conveniently grouped as follows: 
 
Table 1. Monitoring of assets, including disclosure provisions for officials 
placed in sensitive positions.2 
Mechanism Formal provision, legal 
requirement 
What happens in practice 
General disclosure Corruption Control Act 
1960, clause 15 
General disclosure by newly 
appointed ministers on ad 
hoc basis, but there is no 
monitoring system 
Conflict of interest – rules 
governing this 
Civil Code Act 1963, 
Official procedures no.30 
Not followed up at all in 
practice 
Gifts and hospitality – rules and 
registers governing these  
 
Prevailing convention and 
code of conduct 
Gifts and hospitality freely 
accepted 
 
Public disclosure provisions have been increased or made more rigorous with the latest 
Corruption Control Act 2002. 
 
Table 2. Anti-corruption mechanisms in the civil service rules and code of 
conduct. 
Mechanism Formal provision, legal 
requirement 
What happens in 
practice 
Laws establishing criminal and 
administrative sanctions for bribery 
Corruption Control Act 1960 Loopholes in the 
interpretation of what 
construes bribery, 
corruption and burden 
of proof  
Merit based recruitment/ career Criteria determined by Public Merits mostly 
                                                   
2
 The three tables here have been adapted from R. K. Regmee, Firing Corruption, pp. 31-48 
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development rules Service Commission overlooked; nepotism 
and cronyism play 
key role 
Rules to prevent nepotism, 
cronyism 
None  
Rules (including registries) 
governing gifts and hospitality* 
Rules and code of conduct for 
civil servants 
Rules are not usually 
observed 
Procedures (including criteria) for 
publishing administrative 
decisions, e.g. granting permits, 
licences, tax assessments etc. 
Yes, but this is done in an ad 
hoc manner 
 
Rules requiring political 
independence of civil service 
Civil service rules (applies 
more rigorously to gazetted 
officers) 
Political affiliation and 
display of partisan 
faith are rewarded 
* Registries are not kept up to date, nor is there any legal requirement for disclosure.  
 
Table 3. Anti-corruption mechanisms in public procurement requirements. 
Mechanism Formal provision, legal 
requirement 
What happens in 
practice 
Competitive bidding 
requirements for all major 
procurements 
Financial administration 
regulations 
Local self governance 
regulations (financial 
administration) 
Direct purchase or 
submitting of three 
independent quotations 
can be used depending on 
the amount involved 
Advertising of all major 
public procurements 
Required The medium to be used 
(national daily, local daily, 
etc.) is not specified 
Blacklisting of companies 
proved to have bribed in a 
procurement case 
Yes Agencies avoid this 
because of the additional 
burden or for fear of legal 
challenges 
Rules and procedures to 
prevent nepotism/ conflict 
of interest in public 
procurement 
Civil service code of 
conduct and Anti-
corruption Act 1961 
 
 
Publicizing of procurement decisions is not required. Some agencies publicize their 
decisions through their own notice board. 
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Auditing of accounts 
All public expenditures are audited annually and are a deterrent to corrupt practices. 
Audit report recommendations are, however, not complied with seriously, and there is 
little monitoring of compliance as well. 
 
National Vigilance Centre 
The National Vigilance Centre (NVC) was established in 2002 and is under the direct 
supervision of the Prime Minister's Office. The objective of the NVC is to control 
corruption and to raise the general awareness of citizens against it. It provides assurance 
of good governance through preventive and promotional activities to subvert corruption. 
The following are the rights and duties of NVC as provided in the Corruption Control Act 
2002: 
• To collect information on work performance in ministries, departments and offices of 
public agencies; 
• To alert those agencies that are not performing their duties satisfactorily; 
• To monitor the property details and earnings of those in public office; 
• To inspect places and activities vulnerable to corruption, make surprise checks and 
make arrangements for investigations; 
• To advise HMG on required policy reforms, strategies and formulation of laws in 
relation to corruption control; 
• To facilitate the placement of complaint boxes in ministries, departments and other 
public offices; 
• To make suggestions or instruct the agency concerned regarding controlling 
corruption; 
• To keep up to date information on corruption; 
• To communicate corruption-related information to the agency concerned; 
• To carry out other tasks related to corruption control; and 
• To carry out any other tasks assigned by HMG (the NVC is also entitled to carry out 
technical inspections of public infrastructure construction works). 
The NVC's procedural guidelines were formulated and approved in 2003. 
 
3.2 Curative measures 
These mechanisms against corruption are sanctioned by law and profess to be effective 
through punitive measures. As such they only come into play once the act of corruption 
has been committed. As the mechanisms have legal backing, they are necessarily 
enforced by the government through some agency or other. The Commission for the 
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is such an agency, and theoretically public 
officials refrain from corrupt acts for fear of being caught by the CIAA (see CIAA profile, 
below). 
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3.3 Awareness-raising measures 
These measures attempt to curb corruption through education and awareness raising 
about the dangers, ill-effects to society and so on of corruption. The interventions are 
also of a more holistic nature. As they have no base in law, they can only revert to 
persuasion or strong convincing. Nevertheless, because of the nature of corruption as a 
social malaise, awareness-raising measures have the potential of having a much larger 
impact, albeit in a long-term way. No immediate impacts are visible for the impatient 
monitor. 
Usually civil society and the various organizations in it use awareness-raising measures. 
Pro Public, Transparency International and other NGOs working in this field are some 
examples (see institutional profiles, below). 
 
3.4 Other measures 
The work done by the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries 
(FNCCI) Anti-Corruption Project belongs to a different category (see the case report on 
this project in Part 5, below). It is an example of how one sector of society (which is also 
a part of the corruption scenario) has chosen to address the issue on its own initiative. 
Recent things such as Corporate Social Responsibility have had their impact. But it is 
also a spontaneous, ethically aroused declaration by the sector making a commitment to 
be clean.  
 
3.5 Mechanisms employed by the urban poor 
In the present situation of rapid urbanisation and the inability of municipal and other 
services to catch up with growing demand, the residents of poorer communities find it 
much harder to cope with urban life. In interactions with residents and community leaders 
of several squatter settlements of Kathmandu, the following mechanisms were quoted as 
being effective in the procurement of urban services for their areas. They are not anti-
corruption mechanisms explicitly; however, their employment by poor communities has 
made life more bearable for the residents of such communities. 
 
3.5.1 Contacts in service provider agencies 
Having contacts in service agencies is an effective means for procuring otherwise scarce 
services in the Nepalese context. Local ward chairmen have proven to be very helpful to 
residents of squatter settlements. In many cases, a recommendation from the ward office 
authenticates the need for a service in view of the fact that residents of squatter 
settlements are often barred from services because of their tenure status. 
 
3.5.2 Putting pressure on officials by going in a group 
Such pressure is normally carried out by taking a ‘delegation’ of residents to the local 
service provider’s office and demanding services. Quite frequently, the officials 
reciprocate by promising to provide the service (a water or electricity connection) to save 
embarrassment or commotion in front of other consumers.  
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In the case of water, protest marches to the Nepal Water Supply Corporation by 
housewives brandishing empty water pots proved to be effective in eliciting prompt 
responses from the water service provider. 
 
3.5.2.1 Access to municipal services in illegal settlements  
Service providers are usually unwilling to provide services to squatter settlements 
because the need to produce a land ownership certificate when applying for a service 
automatically disqualifies squatter settlement residents from getting services.  
The Society for Preservation of Shelter and Habitation in Nepal (SPOSH-NEPAL) has 
been effective in solving this problem by getting around it. First the Society issued ID 
cards to residents; the ID cards authenticated their tenure dilemma to a certain extent. 
The Society then put pressure on central government agencies to not discriminate 
against squatter settlements because they lacked land ownership certificates. As a result, 
now the ID cards have proved to be very useful in the procurement of various services. 
 
3.5.3 Innovative methods of coping with lack of or limited access to services 
In the face of adversity, squatter communities have ‘invented’ their own mechanisms of 
making do with what is available. For example, in fulfilling their need for water, poor 
communities have devised community water connections (as opposed to public 
standpipes), community water tanks or efficient sharing of electricity connections. 
The levels of provision of infrastructure services in the settlements vary. This is because 
the residents employ different methods to acquire services for their dwellings. Three 
methods had proved useful for the residents of squatter settlements in expediting the 
procurement of services. 
 
3.5.3.1 Having the right contacts or ‘channels’ 
This was probably one of the most effective means for achieving results in the Nepalese 
context. A contact in the right place often put a human face on an otherwise bureaucratic 
and impersonal task. For the Buddhanagar settlement, the local ward chairman had 
proved to be a boon in many matters by utilizing his contacts to get various services for 
the residents. 
 
3.5.3.2 Putting pressure on officials (of service provider agencies) by going in a group 
Service providers are usually unwilling to provide services to squatter settlements 
because the need to produce a land ownership certificate when applying for a service 
automatically disqualifies squatter settlement residents from getting services. The Society 
for Preservation of Shelter and Habitation in Nepal (SPOSH-NEPAL) has been effective 
in solving this problem. First the Society issued ID cards to residents; the ID cards 
authenticated their tenure dilemma to a certain extent. The Society then put pressure on 
central government agencies to not discriminate against squatter settlements because 
they lacked land ownership certificates. As a result, now the ID cards have proved to be 
very useful in the procurement of various services. 
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In the case of water, protest marches to the NWSC by housewives brandishing empty 
water pots proved to be very effective in eliciting prompt responses from the water 
service providers. 
The residents have been able to get services with the help of the local ward chairman 
and by exerting pressure in unison on service providers. This is normally done by taking 
a ‘delegation’ of residents to the local service provider office and demanding for service. 
Quite frequently, the officials reciprocate by promising to provide service (a water or 
electricity connection) to save embarrassment or commotion in front of other consumers. 
The local ward chairman has been a ‘god in disguise’ for the settlement, as he has done 
a lot of things for the area.  
 
3.5.3.3 Paying ‘tea money’ (small bribes) to hasten the execution of various tasks. 
It is the amount of money paid at different stages at service delivery processes to speed 
up the approval and/or information required for approval. 
 
3.6 Power of organization 
Apart from the above, the residents of squatter settlements have found that they have 
empowered themselves in obtaining various city services through organizational unity. All 
squatter or informal settlements are now organized under SPOSH-NEPAL. Each 
individual settlement is represented by a SPOSH unit. There are 40 district-level offices.  
SPOSH also supports its members by helping with money required for deposits and so 
on, when acquiring services or coordinating with NGOs to find support for such funds. 
The main problems in squatter settlements were described as water and then 
scholarships for school going children. However, security of tenure regarding their 
houses was probably the primary problem because a lot of other things were related to 
this. One respondent said ‘it was hard to live peacefully fearing for the very place one 
lived in’. 
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4. Profiles of institutions monitoring or checking corruption 
The institutions monitoring or checking corruption in Nepal are various and, as outlined in 
Part III ‘Description of anti-corruption mechanisms’, they can be grouped under various 
headings according to their activities and focuses. The National Vigilance Centre has 
already been described as an institution that has a preventive role in curbing corruption. 
The CIAA, which has a curative role, is profiled below. This section also describes civil 
society organisations – Pro Public and Transparency International Nepal – the brunt of 
whose work is in awareness-raising to fight corruption. 
 
4.1 Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (ciaa) 
The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority is a top constitutional body to 
curb corruption and its spread of influence in the country. The CIAA has been 
empowered by part 12, article 97 and 98 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 
1990, to investigate and probe cases against persons holding any public office and their 
associates indulging in the abuse of authority by way of corruption and/or improper 
conduct. The commission has the right to file a case against any person in a position of 
authority that is suspected of abusing his or her authority. 
 
4.2 Transparency International Nepal (tin) 
Transparency International Nepal (TI-Nepal) is a civil society institution dedicated to 
increasing public accountability and curbing corruption in all walks of life. It is also part of 
the worldwide network of national branches of Transparency International. TI-Nepal 
operates with the ultimate goal of establishing in Nepal a National Integrity System (NIS). 
Once the NIS is established in Nepal, it envisages that corruption will become a ‘high-
risk’ and ‘low-return’ undertaking. Highlights of TIN support group activities in eight urban 
areas include: 
Regional symposiums on local participation in the control of corruption in collaboration 
with CIAA; 
Anti-corruption messages on hoarding boards in public places (Janankpur and 
Jaleshwor); and 
Programmes in 16 schools with the participation of headmasters, teachers and members 
of school management committees to promote a sense of integrity, ethics and cultural 
development. 
 
4.3 Pro Public 
Pro Public, a non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to the cause of public 
interest, was founded in 1991 by a consortium of environmental lawyers, journalists, 
economists, engineers, consumers and women’s rights activists. It raises its voice 
against corruption, red tape and irregularities and makes government bodies aware of 
their duties and responsibilities. 
Pro Public’s Civil Society Anti-Corruption Project aims to ‘reduce corruption by mobilising 
civil society.’ This will lead towards the project goal of improving the contribution that the 
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Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority, local HMGN offices and civil society 
make to reduce corruption in Nepal. 
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5. Case Report on the FNCCI Anti-Corruption Project 
The private sector is very much perceived to be part and parcel of the corruption problem 
in Nepal. The Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI) 
Anti-Corruption Project (FACP) was established with the notion that all sections of society 
should be involved in rooting out corruption. A number of prominent FNCCI business 
people formed the FNCCI Corporate Ethics Forum, which is made up of 11 members and 
is chaired by the FNCCI president. The Forum paved the way for the development of this 
project. The prime achievements of the project involved the business community in 
developing a Business Code of Conduct (see Appendix 1), establishing a Complaints 
Hearing Unit, disseminating information on combating corruption and reducing incentives 
for corruption. Achieving this purpose will lead to the project goal of reducing overall 
corruption in Nepal. 
The project has established effective collaborative relationships with agencies such as 
the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), the National Vigilance 
Centre, Pro-public, Transparency Nepal, the Office of the Auditor General, the Public 
Accounts Committee, the Committee for Revenue Leakage, Nepal Lawyer’s Association, 
central government departments or agencies such as the customs or revenue 
departments and other professional associations involved in anti-corruption activities. 
In order to mobilize civil society against corruption, FACP sponsored the making of a 
television serial called Virus. As the serial was produced by a popular comedy duo, it 
gained immediate popularity. The production was aired on Nepal TV. FACP also 
organized a rally on anti-corruption awareness in December 2005 in close partnership 
with Pro Public, Transparency International and Swati. 
While organisations like the CIAA and even Pro Public and TIN may make inroads into 
curbing corruption, they are still necessarily ‘watchdogs’ that are supposedly separate 
and untouched by the whole corruption scene. On the other hand, FACP has had to first 
own up to the fact that the private sector (including the business community) is an active 
participant in the corruption scene. The business community has now committed itself to 
uphold a code of conduct and has established a hearing unit to monitor compliance. 
 
  22
6. Conclusion 
This case study suggests the importance of studying corruption in the construction of 
public latrines, common water taps, roads and electric plants and in the way access is 
allocated in order to understand and combat corruption in such types of village and 
neighbourhood-level infrastructure. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Contents of the code of conduct adopted by the 38th Annual General Body Meeting of 
the FNCCI. 
Members of all associations and organizations affiliated to the FNCCI shall make special 
efforts in abiding by the terms enunciated in the Business Code of Conduct as follows:  
• Refrain from engaging in business activities that go against the interests of the state.  
• Pay special attention to the protection and promotion of public welfare in the conduct 
of their business. Desist from activities that jeopardize fair conduct and instead public 
norms and values. 
• Abstain from activities considered detrimental to the general health of the people.  
• Maintain a smooth supply of quality goods and services in the market at fair prices. 
The merchandise shall be of specified weights and standards. There shall be no 
adulteration.  
• Refrain from activities likely to cause artificial shortages of goods in the market. In the 
event of any shortages, shall not conduct business at unfair prices.  
• Abstain from the usage of merchandise or standards prohibited by law.  
• Maintaining faith in fair business competition, provide maximum benefit to the 
consumers.  
• Oppose monopolistic business practices and controlled supply systems (e.g. 
syndicates and cartels) and not be involved in any such groups or systems.  
• Settle business disputes through mutual consultations in an amicable and lawful 
manner. 
• Give precedence to business transparency. 
• Make fair and proper utilization of credit and loans.  
• Show special sensitivity towards environmental protection. 
• Abide by prevalent statutes, laws and process. 
• Submit documents, papers, statements of accounts as well as pay taxes, tariffs and 
levies as required by law and when due. 
• Abstain from dealing in any goods categorized as forbidden or banned by law. 
• Refrain from providing donations or financial assistance to political parties or their 
leaders with considerations of bearing in business deals or for personal benefits. 
• Fix a ceiling on the value of any gift or present to anyone as not to exceed Rs.5,000. 
• Observe the Business Code of Conduct endorsed by the FNCCI by self as well as 
encourage others also to do likewise. 
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